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I. INTRODUCTION
"Dissatisfaction with the operation of mechanistic choice-of-law rules
* . . is certainly not new. But at least in the United States, the time has hardly
ever been more opportune for a radical re-evaluation of this most intricate and
confused area of the law."' This statement about choice of law was made
almost two decades ago, and, indeed, many important developments in con-
flicts law have occurred since that time. The field has been bombarded with
new theories. Some have been consistent with one another,2 others wholly at
odds.3 Some experts have refined their approaches, 4 others have changed
their positions radically.5 A pioneering court in this area, the New York Court
of Appeals, has embraced the new conflicts thinking, 6 struggled to apply it,
7
and finally become so frustrated that it has retreated to old and familiar
territory. 8
Although recent years have brought a flurry of activity in the develop-
ment of choice of law, it is doubtful that the courts have made great progress
toward resolution of the many problems that plague this area of the law. True,
the new approaches have made major inroads. 9 The trend has been to replace
the simple, absolute, traditional rules with a more flexible, case-by-case ap-
proach. The various jurisdictions still are using many differing theories, how-
l. Baade, Foreword, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 673 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211, 213 (1971); Sedler,
Comments in Conflict of Laws Round Table, 49 TEX. L. REV. 224, 224 (1971).
3. Compare Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966),
with Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1971). Leflar includes the better rule of
law as a consideration in choice of law, while Cavers finds it irrelevant, if not misleading.
4. Compare Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L. J. 171, 178,
with Currie, Comments in Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1212, 1242-43 (1963).
5. Compare Cavers, A Critique of tre Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 192-93 (1933),
with Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211, 213-15 (1971). In the first article the
author calls for a flexible approach with the primary goal of promoting justice in the individual case, while in the
second he advocates choice-of-law decisions based on a set of specific rules.
6. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
7. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); Macey v.
Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
8. See, e.g., Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698,376 N.E.2d 914,405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978).
9. See, e.g., Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 19 Ohio Op. 3d 113 (Ct. App. 1980), aff d, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152,
431 N.E.2d 998, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2963 (1982), fora recent Ohio tort case adopting interest analysis, and S
& S Chopper Serv. v. Scripter, 59 Ohio App. 2d 311,394 N.E.2d 1011 (1977), for an Ohio contract case using the
modem analysis.
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ever, 10 and, indeed, different theories often are employed in a single case."
This situation illustrates the lingering uncertainty and disagreement over the
proper law to employ in causes of action including more than one state.
Ohio has not been immune to this problem. Osborn v. Osborn, 2 a 1966
case, contained the first mention of more modem conflicts methodologies in
the area of contract law. This decision was followed in 1971 by Fox v.
Morrison Motor Freight, 13 in which a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court
purported to abandon the traditional choice-of-law rule for tort cases, lex loci
delicti. Just one year later, however, the same court balked at discarding lex
loci completely. 4 The mid and late seventies brought an even greater retreat
toward traditional rules in tort 15 and contract. 6 Consequently, Ohio currently
uses a strange admixture of old and new approaches without following any
theory consistently. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court recently cited Ohio as
one of the traditional jurisdictions, 7 and one commentator placed it among
the states that have abandoned lex loci in tort. 8 The substantial ambiguity and
perplexing inconsistencies of Ohio law demonstrate the current need for a
more systematic approach to choice of law in Ohio.
This Note attempts to confront the lack of harmony and certainty in
present-day choice of law, examine it, and draw conclusions about the current
status of this area of Ohio law. As a starting point, this Note will survey the
major traditional and modem approaches currently being implemented. It will
explore the role of these theories in Ohio tort and contract cases of the last
fifteen years. This Note then will attempt to reconcile the use of conflicting
choice-of-law theories and will outline the present Ohio approach. Finally,
current Ohio practice will be studied and its shortcomings identified. Sugges-
tions will be provided for a more fair and efficient disposition of future choice-
of-law cases.
10. For a sample of the application of modem approaches, see Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,
546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976) (adoption of the comparative impairment test);
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (use of Currie's preference for the law of the forum);
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979) (adoption of Second Restatement's most significant relation-
ship test); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968) (use of the better rule of law approach).
Conflicts theories are in no sense restricted to application internally in the U.S. Indeed, a synonym for "'conflict
of laws" is "private international law." A. KUHN, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1937). The choice-of-
law theories mentioned in this Note are in no sense unique to our system of law, nor limited to domestic
utilization. See K. LIPSTAIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
1-46 (1981).
II. See, e.g., McCluskey v. Rob San Serv., 443 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
12. 10 Ohio Misc. 171,226 N.E.2d 814 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1966), afJ'd, IS Ohio St. 2d 144,248 N.E.2d
191 (1969).
13. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
14. Schiltz v. Meyer, 29 Ohio St. 2d 169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972).
15. McCluskey v. Rob San Serv., 443 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
16. Arsham v. Banci, 511 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1975).
17. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. 1979).
18. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.16, at 305-06 n.47 (2d ed. 1980).
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II. OVERVIEW OF CHOICE-OF-LAW THEORIES
To understand the development of choice of law in Ohio, one first must
become familiar with both the traditional and the modem approaches to this
area of the law. Because the field is in a state of transition, one finds a mixture
of old and new methodologies in almost every recent conflicts case. An attor-
ney confronted with a choice-of-law issue must be prepared to deal with
several theories. Although this situation complicates the task of the practi-
tioner, it also provides him or her with a great deal of freedom to argue
effectively on the merits of the particular case.
A. Lex Fori-The Primitive Approach
The oldest, most basic approach is of necessity the proper starting point
for a survey of traditional choice-of-law methodologies. That approach is lex
fori, the rule by which a court always applies its own law, whether public or
private. 19 Although the forum oriented system has not survived in its original
form, it remains relevant to current conflict-of-law theory in two important
respects. First, courts have continued to apply only the law of the forum in
matters of public law. 20 Second, lex fori still is used exclusively to resolve
procedural issues,- including issues of remedy. 22 In addition, because a
forum is most comfortable applying its own law and owes allegiance to its own
jurisdiction's lawmaking bodies, lex fori constitutes a residual conflicts rule
on which courts rely when uncertain. 23 Some advocates of modem choice-of-
law theories have incorporated in the systems they propose a preference for
the law of the forum.24
B. The Traditional Approach
1. Underlying Concepts
The traditional theories of conflict of laws that had been articulated by
Ulricus Huberus in the seventeenth century became the basis for American
thought on the subject as a result of the work of Justice Story, a leading jurist
and legal scholar of the nineteenth century. Story's principal contribution to
19. Id. §§ 105, 107-108 (1962). This volume contains a thorough discussion of the history oflexforiand its
use internationally. The system of law that governs the relationship between the state, in its role as sovereign,
and the individual is denoted as "'public." This category includes criminal law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (5th ed. 1979). Private law, on the other hand, controls the relations between individuals in their private
capacities. Id. at 1076.
20. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.17 (1982).
21. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 121 (3d ed. 1977).
22. Id. § 126.
23. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.7, at 22 (1982).
24. See, e.g., Currie, On tire Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958);
Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Foruntm: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L.
REV. 340 (1965). See also infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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American choice of law was the promulgation of the doctrine of comity. Early
in this century Joseph H. Beale's work contributed a second major doctrine to
the evolution of choice of law in America, the doctrine of vested rights. 5 The
contributions of these three scholars formed a strong foundation for the evolu-
tion of choice of law in the United States.
These twin doctrines of comity and vested rights are a crucial part of
conflicts theory. Comity and reciprocal recognition of foreign law assume that
a state's law has effect only within its territorial boundaries, 26 but acknowl-
edge that the need for justice and cooperation between states requires the
courts of a state to enforce certain rights arising under foreign law.2 7 The
doctrine of vested rights rests on the premise that once a legal relation is
created by the substantive law of a state in which the underlying events
occurred, that right assumes an independent existence, which transcends
territorial boundaries. 8 While the concepts of comity and vested rights are
inconsistent on a fundamental, theoretical level, in practice they are com-
plementary. For only when rights are sufficiently vested "at home" will they
be enforced, through comity, abroad.29
2. The Approach of the First Restatement
The major traditional approach for choice of law is embodied in the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. Under the first Restatement issues of
private law are placed in broad categories that roughly correspond to major
subject areas of law, such as tort or contract. Each category is governed by a
specific set of rules. For example, in tort lex loci delicti, the law of the place of
the wrong, controls.30 In contract, issues of the interpretation, existence, and
nature of a contract are governed by lex loci contractus, the law of the place
where the agreement is made.3 1 Issues of performance are covered by lex
solutionis, the place where the contract is to be carried out,3 and questions of
remedy are determined by lex fori.33
The traditional approach to choice of law has been in use for many
decades 34 and has not lost its place as the backbone of this area of the law.
Despite its age and importance, however, the shortcomings of the traditional
system have prompted considerable criticism. For although the old rules have
the advantage of uniformity, they are seen by some as being too rigid and
25. See generally K. NADELMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE 1-40
(1972).
26. J. BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1935).
27. R. GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 (7th ed. 1974); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICTOF LAWS
§ 2.4 (1982).
28. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.5 (1982).
29. J. BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15, 16, 48 (1935).
30. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 379 (1934).
31. Id. § 332.
32. Id. § 358.
33. Id. § 372.
34. One of the earliest Ohio cases to use this approach was Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., 48 Ohio St. 623,
30 N.E. 69 (1891).
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mechanical.35 The traditional system was attacked by one of its earliest critics
because it did not consistently achieve justice in every case.36 It also has been
denigrated for failing to inquire into the content of a competing state's laws.37
In addition, some commentators have discredited the traditional rules be-
cause they often require courts to make blind choices that result in the ap-
plication of a state's law even though that state has no interest in the action. 8
C. Modern Theories
These problems with the traditional approach have led scholars to search
for alternatives. In general, these new theories replace the rule oriented meth-
odology of the first Restatement with more flexible, general guidelines. The
new approaches provide guidelines that courts should consider in conflicts
decisions. These methodologies do not dictate which law is to be applied, but
instead delegate to the courts the task of weighing the factors in light of the
circumstances of the particular case.
Because the basic approaches of the major new conflicts theories overlap
considerably, a description of their general components should suffice as a
background for the discussion of the development of Ohio choice of law.39
This section discusses the following three approaches: (1) Interest analysis
(Currie's in particular 40 ), (2) the Second Restatement,4' and (3) Leflar's
42
choice-influencing considerations. All these approaches contain elements of
interest analysis in the sense that each provides for some investigation into
the governmental concerns that arise in multistate litigation. Their methodol-
ogy is sufficiently different, however, to make a study of their individual
characteristics fruitful.
1. Interest Analysis
In its broadest sense, interest analysis looks beyond adherence to
mechanical rules and focuses on the possible justifications for their applica-
tion. Those who advocate a departure from the traditional approach believe
that multistate causes of action generate concerns on the part of many or all
of the states involved.43 For example, the new school of conflicts recognizes
35. See, e.g., W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); Currie,
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 754-55 (1963). See also supra text ac-
companying note I.
36. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173,173-203 (1933). See also Fox
v. Morrison Motor Freight, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971), an Ohio case
in which the traditional approach was attacked for failing to achieve justice.
37. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 192-97 (1933).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52.
39. This Note's discussion of choice-of-law developments is limited to the attributes of three major ap-
proaches. Readers seeking a more thorough study of the field will find an excellent bibliography of the essential
sources on conflicts law in J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 3-4 (1978).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 48-54.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 62-83.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 84-93.
43. See. e.g., Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in XXTH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW; LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 349,357 (1961).
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that although the place of the injury may be very important in tort actions, the
only reasonable choice of law is not necessarily the law of the state where the
injury occurred." Proponents of the new school submit that a court should
consider all relevant interests before making a conflicts decision.45 In this
respect, interest analysis is an attempt to tailor the choice of law to the facts
under litigation to achieve a more just outcome in actions with consequences
in more than one state.
a. Interest Analysis in General
Although theories of interest analysis contain many variations, one can
generalize to some extent about the methodology of this approach to conflicts
law. As one scholar has noted,
A governmental interest in a choice-of-law case, in its simplest sense, is discover-
able by putting together (a) the reasons supporting the rule of law in question (F's
or X's law) and (b) the state's (F's orX's) factual contacts with a case, or the issue
in a case, to see if they match.46
Interest analysis can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that an
Ohio resident is injured by an Idaho resident in an automobile accident in
Idaho, and further, that Ohio has no limit on damages, while Idaho permits
recovery only for medical expenses. Ohio would have a legitimate interest in
compensating resident accident victims, while Idaho justifiably would be con-
cerned about protecting resident defendants and their insurers from higher
recoveries. The general inclination of the courts that have adopted interest
analysis has been to weigh the competing governmental interests and apply
the law of the state with the greatest overall concern in the particular issue.
Although advocates of interest analysis agree on the approach in general, they
are often at odds regarding the specific circumstances to be analyzed and the
relative weights of each of these considerations. The following survey of the
major methodologies demonstrates this lack of harmony in modern choice of
law.
b. The Currie Approach
One of the leading theories in current conflicts law is that of Brainerd
Currie. 48 This legal scholar provided the initial impetus for what has become a
mushrooming field of intellectual debate. Although Currie's system for choice
44. See, e.g., E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17.2-.3 (1982); R. WEINTRAUB, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1.I-.3 (2d ed. 1980).
45. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 106 (3d ed. 1977).
46. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 291 (1966).
47. See, e.g., id. at 291-93. Compare Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law. 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966), with Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1971).
Leflar includes the better rule of law as a consideration in choice of law, while Cavers finds it irrelevant, if not
misleading.
48. For a comprehensive collection of Currie's writing, see B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
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of law often is grouped with other theories of interest analysis, the Currie
system is unique because it utilizes a very limited study of governmental
concerns. Currie was the first to propose a study of interests as an alternative
to traditional conflicts methods, 49 and because of his prolific, well-written
commentary on conflicts, his approach is important to an understanding of the
field.
Under the Currie system of choice of law courts must consider three
contacts: (1) the domicile of the parties, (2) the place where the relevant
events occurred, and (3) the place where the action is brought.5 0 In general,
this approach directs courts to ascertain the policies expressed in the poten-
tially applicable law and to consider the extent to which the involved states
could be reasonably interested in having these policies applied.5 ' The courts
then should look closely at the specific interests of the states; attempt, if
possible, to resolve any conflicts; and then proceed to apply the law of the
state with the paramount interests. 2
Currie's most important contribution to the field of choice of law, how-
ever, is the distinction between a true conflict of interest, which arises when
two or more states have significant interests that are at odds, and a false
conflict, which occurs when only one state has a real concern in having its law
applied.5 3 This true-false dichotomy has been lauded by other legal scholars
and the courts.54
Hurtado v. Superior Court55 demonstrates the adoption of Currie's anal-
ysis by a California court.5 6 Plaintiffs were residents of Mexico and defen-
dants resided in California. Mexico limited the recovery for wrongful death;
California did not. 57 The California Supreme Court refused to apply the law of
Mexico, plaintiff's domicile, arguing that Mexico had no interest in protecting
a nonresident defendant, and was not concerned with denying recovery to
Mexican widows and orphans.5 8
In addition to promoting the greatest possible use of false conflicts,
Currie placed strong emphasis on the law of the forum.59 In the Currie ap-
proach lex fori applies to every case in which a flexible interpretation of the
interests concerned does not yield a false conflict. Currie suggested that inter-
49. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 92 (3d ed. 1977).
50. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227,
231-32 (1958).
51. Currie, Comments in Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 1212, 1242 (1963).
52. Id. at 1242-43.
53. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227,
251-63 (1958).
54. J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 85 (1980); see, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 58 & 151.
55. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
56. Id. at 579-82, 522 P.2d at 669-71, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 109-11.
57. Id. at 578, 522 P.2d at 668, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
58. Id. at 581-82, 522 P.2d at 670-71, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
59. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.6, at 38-39 n.l (1982).
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ests should be considered in choice-of-law decisions and eschewed the blind
application of any law. Nevertheless, he did not abandon completely the more
traditional jurisdiction-selecting approaches in favor of a law-selecting 6
system of conflicts.6 1
2. The Second Restatement
The approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is a
compilation of the ideas advanced by a number of legal scholars. 62 The
drafters sought to synthesize the traditional and modem approaches. The
result was a three-tiered system that progresses from the general to the specif-
ic. Section 6 lists 7 considerations that are relevant to every choice-of-law
decision. 63 These include, but are not limited to, the following: Policies of the
forum64 and of "other interested states"; 65 policies prevalent in "the partic-
ular field of law";6 "certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result"; 67
and "protection of justified expectations." 68 Subsequent sections list specific
guidelines for particular areas of law. In tort, section 145 requires the applica-
tion of the law with the "most significant relationship" to the event and the
parties. The relevant contacts are (1) the place of the injury; (2) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile of the parties;
and (4) the place of the relationship. 69 Note that this approach differs from
Currie's system in that the Second Restatement does not contain a preference
60. Id. § 2.6, at I9-20.
61. Currie, Comments in Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 1212, 1242-43 (1963). It is interesting to note that Currie favors this result even when the forum has no
interest whatsoever in the application of its own law.
62. As one legal scholar has stated, "By and large, the new Restatement is a monument to the fundamental
changes that have in the last decades taken place in American thinking regarding the choice-of-law problem."
von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 964 (1975). But see
Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700, 701 (1963). Ehrenzweig noted that many of the leading
conflicts scholars opposed the drafting of a second Restatement and did not participate in its formulation.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). The full text of § 6 is as follows:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
For a description of the underlying policies and objectives of the Second Restatement, see Reese, Conflict of
Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679 (1963).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b) (1971).
65. Id. § 6(2)(c).
66. Id. § 6(2)(e).
67. Id. § 6(2)(f.
68. Id. § 6(2)(d).
69. Id. § 145.
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for lex fori. Although both section 6 and section 145 are consistent with
modem trends, the last section, section 146, refers the court to the law of the
place of the injury unless another state has a more significant relationship to
the event and the parties. 70 Thus, the Second Restatement retains a pref-
erence for the traditional lex loci delicti.
The Second Restatement's rules for contracts 71 are very similar to its
approach for torts. Again, the general considerations of section 6 apply. 72 The
second prong of the contracts rules mandates the application, when possible,
of the law of the state chosen by the parties. 73 In the absence of an effective
choice by the parties, the Second Restatement requires application of a most
significant relationship test and lists the relevant contacts. 74 These include the
place where the contract was negotiated and made, the place of performance,
the place where the subject matter is located, and the residence or domicile of
the parties.75
To this point the approach is very much in line with modem thinking: it is
flexible and does not preclude tailoring a choice-of-law decision to the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. However, section 188 adds that the local
law76 of the state in which the agreement is negotiated and performed will be
applied when both of these events occur in one state." Although this last
provision is not as reminiscent of traditional rules as is section 146 in tort, it
significantly reduces the flexibility of a court that has adopted the Second
Restatement.
Undoubtedly, the drafters' attempt to reduce the advances of recent
years to a coherent set of rules is a significant contribution to the development
of conflicts theory. 78 At a minimum, the Second Restatement provides a fairly
comprehensive list of the major considerations in choice of law. As one com-
mentator has noted, "IT]he Second Restatement, with its generalities and
lack of priorities, lends itself to all comers ....,,79
The Second Restatement, however, has not been immune to criticism.
80
At least one scholar has characterized it as an attempt to furnish rules in an
70. Id. § 146.
71. Id. §§ 6, 187, 188.
72. See supra note 63.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
74. Id. § 188(2).
75. Id.
76. A problem arises when one state's choice-of-law rules refer the court to the law of another state,
including the conflicts rules. This may result in an endless seesawing from the law of one state to that of the
other. To avoid this problem, conflicts rules often require the application of only the foreign state's substantive
law. This doctrine is called renvoL A brief discussion of the concept may be found in R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW § 7 (3d ed. 1977). For a lengthier and more historical treatment of this subject, see R.
GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 64-77 (7th ed. 1974).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(3) (1971).
78. Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 860, 861 (1963).
79. Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1644, 1667 (1981).
80. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts: Law and
Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700 (1963).
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area of law not yet sufficiently developed to provide clear guidelines, rather
than a systematic record of the law as it actually is used by the courts."' In
addition, the Second Restatement fails to consider the interests of the forum
qua forum, which certain commentators have seen as an important considera-
tion in any choice-of-law decision.8 2 Furthermore, because the Second
Restatement approach is vague in its first two levels of analysis, those who
seek uniform results in conflicts law may not be satisfied.83
3. Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations
The third major conflicts methodology, that of Professor Leflar, is very
similar to the Second Restatement approach in its flexibility. Indeed, it can be
considered a variation of interest analysis 84 because it provides no hard and
fast rules, but rather requires a study of many different considerations.
Instead of the Second Restatement's multifaceted, multitiered approach,
Leflar provides only five "choice-influencing considerations" that apply to all
areas of the law. 85 According to Leflar, the following considerations should be
weighed by the courts: (1) Predictability of results, (2) maintenance of inter-
state and international order, (3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) ad-
vancement of the forum's governmental interests, and (5) application of the
better rule of law. 86 Leflar's approach differs significantly from other theories
in its inclusion of the better rule of law, defined as "superiority of one rule of
law over another, in terms of socio-economic jurisprudential standards
.... ,, 87 The suggestion that choice-of-law decisions should be based, even in
part, on the bench's view of the optimal law has evoked considerable con-
troversy. 88 In the opinion of some critics, the better rule method allows for
arbitrary decisions based on ambiguous standards. 89
Leflar is unique also because he has taken no credit for developing the
individual elements of his approach. 9° He has argued that his five considera-
tions encompass all the important advancements in the field and that they are
sufficient in themselves to resolve fairly and adequately any choice-of-law
81. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § "2.15 (1982). But see, e.g., Leflar, Choice-
Influencing Considerations it Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 (1966).
82. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 59.
83. See, e.g., von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance
i, Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347 (1974).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 43-61.
85. Leflar, Choice-liflencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 (1966).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 296. For application of this principle in a leading case, see Clark v. Clark. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d
205 (1966).
88. See, e.g., Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211, 212-15 (1971), for
criticism of this approach. In agreement with Leflar, see, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.27 (2d ed. 1980).
89. See generally Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211,213 (1971); Neuhaus,
Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 795, 802 (1963).
90. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 (1966).
Others, however, credit Leflar with being the father of the better rule of law principle. See, e.g., Cavers, The
Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV: 211, 213 (1971).
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issue that may arise. 9' Because both its author and its proponents have
espoused it as a complete system that realistically represents the current
status of the law, 92 Leflar's system has appealed to some state courts. 93
JI1. OHIO CHOICE OF LAW IN CONTRACT CASES
If Ohio were not currently straddling the old and the new conflicts
methodologies, familiarity with the variety of approaches and the current
intellectual debate in the field would not be necessary. Because the uncer-
tainty in the field of conflicts apparently will not be eliminated in the im-
mediate future, the bench and the bar alike must strive to make the best use of
the scant authority available. This effort requires careful investigation of
existing Ohio cases. Although the identification of clear-cut guidelines is un-
likely, a study of precedent serves to uncover the general trends of the law in
recent years. A review of Ohio cases also will reveal the inadequacies of past
decisions and facilitate a more intelligent disposition of future cases.
Although Ohio first considered modem conflicts theories in a contracts
case, 94 Ohio courts generally have been more hesitant to accept interest
analysis in contract than in tort. The flexibility of the traditional rules for
contract may explain this lag. Because courts are able to tailor the traditional
rules to provide justice in the individual case, these rules have been more
resistant to erosion.
A. The Traditional Rules and Their Applications in Earlier Cases
Under traditional conflict rules for contract, issues are divided into
categories. A different rule applies to each issue. As indicated above, lex loci
contractus, the place of the making, controls issues of existence, interpreta-
tion, and nature of the contract; lex solutionis, the place where the contract is
carried out, governs issues of performance; and lexfori, the law of the forum,
decides issues of remedy. 95 Ohio accepted these rules as early as 1927 in
North British & Mercantile Insurance Co. v. Garber. 96 This case also exem-
plifies the use of the traditional escape device, public policy. Under the public
policy exception courts refuse to utilize an otherwise applicable foreign law
because it is repugnant to the policy of the forum. 97 The North British court
declined to enforce an unfiled conditional sales contract made in Utah, where
it was valid, against an innocent purchaser. Ohio had enacted legislation
protecting persons who bought property without notice of the existence of
91. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10, 10-11 (1977).
92. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 281 (1966).
93. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.27, at 328 n.41 (2d ed. 1980),
for a list of states that have used Leflar's better law approach.
94. Osborn v. Osborn, 10 Ohio Misc. 171,226 N.E.2d 814 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1966), ajJ'd, 18 Ohio St.
2d 144, 248 N.E.2d 191 (1969).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
96. 5 Ohio L. Abs. 746 (Montgomery County Ct. App. 1927).
97. Id. at 746. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 149.
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such a contract. The court considered itself bound to give effect to this policy
and, therefore, refused to apply Utah law.
98
In 1941 the traditional rules for choice of law were ratified once again in
Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm.99 The Alropa court emphasized that remedies
are governed by lexfori. It restated the general rule that statutes of limitation
are remedial,' ° but specified an important exception to that rule when a
borrowing statute was in force. In 1941 such a law existed in Ohio. Ohio's
borrowing statute required displacement of the forum's statute of limitation
by the statute of the state where the injury occurred if that time period was
shorter.'"" Because Florida, the place where the defendants executed and
defaulted on the mortgage, had a shorter statute of limitations, its law pre-
cluded recovery. 1
02
Standard Agencies v. Russell,0 which followed Alropa in 1954, demon-
strated Ohio's continued acceptance of the traditional conflicts rules in con-
tract. The Standard Agencies court held that whether a contract is usurious
must be determined by lex loci contractus. The court further noted that be-
cause public policy had not been violated, Indiana law, the law of the place
where the agreement was made, applied.04
B. Osborn v. Osborn-solated Recognition of the Modern Approach
In 1966 an Ohio court of common pleas reached a decision that differed
from both previous and subsequent contract cases in its adoption of a modern
method for choice of law. Osborn v. Osborn'05 concerned an antenuptial
agreement between a Massachusetts and an Ohio resident. The contract had
been drafted in Ohio and executed in Massachusetts. Although the ceremony
was performed in Massachusetts, the couple thereafter made their home in
Ohio. '" The wife, plaintiff in this case, sued her deceased husband's trustee
and executor to invalidate the contract and claimed that the parties had in-
tended that Ohio law govern.'07 She argued that the court, therefore, should
apply Ohio law and strike down the agreement. 0 The court found that Ohio
law controlled, but nevertheless held that the contract was binding.'°9
98. 5 Ohio L. Abs. 746, 746 (Montgomery County Ct. App. 1927).
99. 138 Ohio St. 30, 34-35, 33 N.E.2d 655, 657 (1941).
100. The Ohio Supreme Court stated:
Whatever pertains to the remedy is to be determined by the law of the forum alone. This is so because
each state regulates its own jurisprudence in its own way. It has its own way of enforcing rights and
redressing wrongs. This in no way depends upon what the parties have agreed to, but to the policy of
the law of the forum as a matter of its internal ... [policy].
Id. at 37, 33 N.E.2d at 658 (quoting Coral Gables, Inc. v. Christopher, 108 Vt. 414,417, 189 A. 147, 149 (1937)).
101. OHIO GEN. CODE § 11,234 (1910) (repealed 1965).
102. Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio St. 30, 40, 33 N.E.2d 655, 658 (1941).
103. 100 Ohio App. 140, 135 N.E.2d 896 (1954).
104. Id. at 143, 135 N.E.2d at 898-99.
105. 10 Ohio Misc. 171, 226 N.E.2d 814 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1966), affd, 18 Ohio St. 2d 144, 248
N.E.2d 191 (1969).
106. Id. at 172-73, 226 N.E.2d at 815-16.
107. Id. at 172, 226 N.E.2d at 815.
108. Id. at 175, 226 N.E.2d at 817.
109. Id. at 182, 226 N.E.2d at 821.
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Although the traditional rule would have required application of Mas-
sachusetts law, the Osborn court decided that when a contract is made in one
state in anticipation of performance in another, the law of the latter state
determines the validity, obligations, and effect of that agreement."" This
holding would have resolved the issue, but the court nevertheless continued,
noting that Ohio followed the American Law Institute's "most significant
contacts" approach. "' According to the Osborn court, this approach requires
more emphasis on the intentions of the parties and other relevant considera-
tions. 1 2 The court noted that Ohio had a great interest in the marital relations
and property rights of its citizens. Because both the married couple and the
property were located in Ohio, and because the defendants also resided there,
the court concluded that Ohio possessed "the most significant contacts with
and a paramount interest in" the contract."'
As early as 1966, then, an Ohio case not only demonstrated judicial
awareness of the developments in choice-of-law theory, but also indicated an
understanding of the theory's proper application. The Osborn court cited no
major precedent for its approach; the lack of precedent was not even raised in
the court of appeals, where the trial court's decision was reversed on other
grounds. "1 4 In the end, however, the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the ver-
dict of the lowest court, again with no mention of the choice-of-law issue."
5
C. Continued Adherence to Traditional Rules
Although Osborn appeared to change the direction of choice of law in
Ohio, subsequent decisions failed to follow this case. In Arsham v. Banci "
6
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit continued Ohio's
reliance on traditional methodologies. Arsham concerned a breach of an oral
contract, " 7 and the issue was whether the agreement was invalid under the
New York statute of frauds. "8 The court maintained that Ohio employed lex
loci contractus, the traditional rule, and recognized that Ohio treated statutes
of fraud as procedural. The court noted, however, that if the statute of the
state where the contract was made would invalidate the agreement, Ohio
courts also would refuse enforcement" 9 because a contract void where made
is void everywhere.'
110. Id. at 176, 226 N.E.2d at 818.
!II. Id. at 176-77, 226 N.E.2d at 818. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1)
(1971).
112. Osborn v. Osborn, 10 Ohio Misc. 171, 176, 226 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1966), afyd,
18 Ohio St. 2d 144, 248 N.E.2d 191 (1969).
113. Id. at 177, 226 N.E.2d at 818.
114. 18 Ohio St. 2d 144, 147, 248 N.E.2d 191, 192 (1969).
115. Id.
116. 511 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1975).
117. Id. at 1110.
118. Id. at 1114.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting 9 OHIO JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 116 (1954)).
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This reasoning is identical to that used in the vested rights theory of
choice of law. Under a vested rights system, for a right to vest in the plaintiff
the right must accrue by the law of the state where the underlying event
occurred. Only then can the plaintiff assert that right in a different jurisdic-
tion. 2 1 The court's use of vested rights analysis reflects Ohio's strong ad-
herence to the traditional theories enumerated in the first Restatement. '
Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc.,'2 another case concerning an
oral contract, was decided by a federal court shortly after Arsham. In
Perlmuter the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio affirmed Ohio's
continued reliance on lex loci contractus and declared that the statute of
frauds was procedural and remedial and, therefore, controlled by lexfori,24
Noting that the laws of Ohio and New Jersey were nearly identical, the
Perlmuter court applied Ohio law.'5
D. Influence of Modern Theories in Contract
Finally, in 1977, eleven years after the decision in Osborn and subsequent
to Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, 6 discussed below, an Ohio appellate
court showed a willingness to employ the new conflicts theories in a contract
case. S & S Chopper Service v. Scripter127 adopted the approach of the
Second Restatement. 2 8 The suit arose from a crop dusting contract between
plaintiff, a Michigan corporation doing business in Michigan and Ohio, and
defendant, a Florida resident doing business in Florida and Ohio. Each party
had signed the agreement in his home state. Scripter had terminated his em-
ployment with S & S Chopper Service. Plaintiff sued Scripter for violation of
a clause in the agreement that prohibited Scripter from competing with his
former employer. The subject matter of the contract was crop-dusting serv-
ices to be performed almost exclusively in Ohio. Michigan law voided the
clause; in Ohio and Florida it was enforceable if reasonable. The court de-
cided to apply Ohio law. 2
9
In upholding the decision of the lower court the appellate court found that
the principles of section 6 of the Second Restatement'30 and the contacts
listed in section 188 '1' had been adequately considered below.' 32 Because the
parties had contemplated performance of the contract in Ohio, the court held
121. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 86 (3d ed. 1977), for an excellent discussion of this
concept.
122. See supra part ll(B)(2).
123. 436 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
124. Id. at 413. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
125. 436 F. Supp. 409, 413 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
126. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
127. 59 Ohio App. 2d 311, 394 N.E.2d 1011 (1977).
128. Id. at 312-13, 394 N.E.2d at 1012-13.
129. Id. at 311-13, 394 N.E.2d at 1012-13.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes
62-75.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
132. S & S Chopper Serv. v. Scripter, 59 Ohio App. 2d 311, 313, 394 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (1977).
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that Ohio had the "most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties." 133 Note that the issue was the validity of a clause in the contract; this
issue would be governed by lex loci contractus under the traditional rules.
Therefore, not only the analysis but also the result of Chopper Service indi-
cates a decreasing reliance on traditional conflicts methodologies. Still, the
court did not state explicitly that it was abandoning the approach of the first
Restatement. A careful study of the reasoning in this case leads to the con-
clusion that, for this court, the old rules coexisted with the new.1
34
E. The Current Status of Ohio Choice of Law in Contract
It would be misleading to suggest that the above survey of Ohio contracts
cases has revealed a definite trend in Ohio law. While the holdings of
Standard Agencies, Alropa, Arsham, and Perlmuter suggest that the tradi-
tional choice-of-law rules are firmly entrenched in Ohio, Osborn and Chopper
Service cast doubt on this conclusion. Despite the lack of a clear-cut line of
precedent, however, Ohio law seems to have changed in the last two decades
and probably will continue its metamorphosis. The four cases using tradi-
tional methodologies indicate that Ohio courts favor the use of the first
Restatement for the majority of cases. Osborn and Chopper Service are not
inconsistent with this conclusion, but rather spell out an exception to it. When
courts find that traditional rules do not resolve the case at hand adequately,
they may turn to the newer type of analysis. Thus, if justice, logic, or the
expectations of the parties demand the application of a law other than that
mandated by the traditional rules, a progressive court is likely to invoke the
methodology of interest analysis. The existence of cases such as Osborn and
Chopper Service might facilitate arguments of counsel and decisions by the
courts that depart from the traditional rules. In addition, the trend toward
more flexible choice-of-law rules in tort, outlined below, 35 may provide
further impetus toward change. Ultimately, however, courts will invoke
interest analysis only when they perceive that its application will produce
significant benefits.
IV. OHIO CHOICE OF LAW IN TORT CASES
Developments in Ohio conflicts law in the area of tort parallel those in
contract. In general, the traditional, rule oriented approach has been under-
mined by the flexible, case-by-case analysis of modern theories. Because only
one traditional choice-of-law rule exists for tort, lex loci delicti, '36 and be-
133. Id. at 311, 394 N.E.2d at 1012.
134. Id. at 312-13, 394 N.E.2d at 1012-13. Although the court repeatedly referred to the Second Restate-
ment, which lists four considerations for a choice-of-law decision, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 188 (1971). the court did not deny that Ohio uses the traditional lex solutionis, the law of the place of
performance.
135. See infra part IV.
136. See supra text accompanying note 30.
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
cause this rule is inherently less amenable to adjustment to the equities of
individual cases, the Ohio courts generally have been more dissatisfied with
traditional methodologies. This dissatisfaction has encouraged a trend toward
adoption of interest analysis in tort that is more marked than the trend in other
areas of conflicts law.
In addition, several other factors have made Ohio courts more receptive
to the new modes of analysis in cases concerning injury to the person. First,
because tort litigation often arises from fortuitous events that adversely affect
the health and welfare of the victims, some courts tend to disfavor a choice-
of-law rule such as lex loci delicti, which may force them to make decisions
that they believe are fundamentally unfair. 137 Second, the existence of guest
statutes, wrongful death statutes, and comparative or contributory negligence
standards that differ widely from state to state has resulted in a relatively large
number of multistate tort cases in which choice of law is crucial to re-
covery.1 38 Accordingly, courts have frequently been forced to consider the
merits of lex loci delicti. Third, catastrophic events like the Chicago airport
disaster'39 and the recent crash of Air Florida Flight 90 in Washington,
D.C. 140 give rise to huge multistate litigation and place conflicts law in the
spotlight. Tort law thus has been at the forefront of the reevaluation of choice-
of-law rules, both in the nation generally and in Ohio specifically.
A. The Beginnings of Modern Choice of Law in Ohio-Fox v. Morrison
Motor Freight
Ohio retained lex loci delicti, the traditional tort rule, long after other
courts had begun to adopt interest analysis and similar theories. 14' Finally, in
the 1971 decision of Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight142 the Ohio Supreme
Court critically examined the established conflicts methodologies and
adopted a more modern approach for resolving multistate issues. Five years
had passed since the Osborn court had mentioned the modern theories. 43 The
Fox case is extremely important to Ohio conflicts law because it established
the theoretical framework for the subsequent development of modem choice
of law in this state.
137. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 173-203 (1933). See also
Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193,267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971), an Ohio
case in which the traditional approach was attacked for failing to achieve justice.
138. See, e.g., Schiltz v. Meyer, 29 Ohio St. 2d 169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972) (Ohio's application of its own
guest statute precludes recovery); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971) (Illinois limitation on damages for wrongful death not applied because of Ohio's
policy of full recovery).
139. In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1931).
140. See Air Crash Bar Mobilizes to Plot D.C. Strategy, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 1, 1932, at 3, col. 1.
141. Indeed, Ohio explicitly recognized that as early as 1965, eighteen states already had discontinued strict
adherence to lex loci delicti. Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied,
403 U.S. 931 (1971). For an example of one of the earliest and most influential decisions using a more flexible,
modem analysis, see Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
142. 25 Ohio St. 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
143. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
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Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight was a suit for wrongful death by an Ohio
administrator of the estate of an Ohio decedent against a corporation that had
trucking terminals in Ohio. The accident in which the Ohio resident was killed
occurred in Illinois. Both drivers, however, had started their journeys in Ohio
and had planned to end them there.'44 Unlike Ohio, Illinois placed a limit on
damages for wrongful death. The Ohio Supreme Court refused to follow the
traditional lex loci rule. Instead, it decided that Ohio law should be applied.' 45
Although all the justices agreed on the result, they could reach no consensus
on the correct analysis.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Duncan and joined by five mem-
bers of the court, acknowledged Ohio's deeply ingrained dependence on lex
loci delicti.46 Nevertheless, Justice Duncan criticized the traditional rule,
arguing that it did not consistently produce just results and that its automatic
application should be abandoned. 47 He noted that because the Ohio Constitu-
tion prohibited limitation on recovery for wrongful death'4 the court would
have been justified in invoking the public policy exception to lex loci. 49 This
exception traditionally is invoked when the application of the law mandated
by conflicts rules is repugnant to the forum's legislative policy. 5 0 Justice
Duncan apparently saw a need for change in this area of the law, however,
and, therefore, did not base his opinion on the traditional exception. Instead,
he turned to the new conflicts methodologies. He studied the interests of the
states concerned and found a false conflict. 151
The sole issue presented by the case was which state's law should be
chosen for determining damages. 5 2 Because none of the parties were res-
idents of Illinois, Justice Duncan decided that Illinois had no interest in lim-
iting recovery. Ohio, on the other hand, naturally was concerned with com-
pensation for families of Ohio residents killed in accidents and with adminis-
tration of Ohio estates. '5 Therefore, the court had no reason to apply Illinois
144. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 194, 267 N.E.2d 405, 405-06, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
145. Id. at 195, 267 N.E.2d at 406.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 196-97, 267 N.E.2d at 407. The other major exceptions to the traditional rules are (a) use of
general law when possible, i.e., look at any jurisdiction that would validate a contract on the theory that the
trend is toward validation; (b) reference to the intention of the parties, i.e., look at the law that the parties
intended to govern the agreement; and (c) characterization of issues, i.e., decide that the issue is procedural,
thus governed by lex fori, to avoid application of foreign law. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem. 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 182-87 (1933).
150. For further explanation of the public policy exception and its use in sample cases, see R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.6 (2d ed. 1980).
151. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 198, 267 N.E.2d 405, 408, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971). Although Justice
Duncan cited Justice Traynor's article, Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657
(1959), for the true-false conflict dichotomy, this part of the decision clearly was also attributable to the
teachings of Currie. See supra text accompanying notes 48-61.
152. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 195, 267 N.E.2d 405, 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
153. Id. at 198, 267 N.E.2d at 408. Note that the administration of the estate was not related to the question
of the amount of damages allowable and would not have been relevant to interest analysis. See supra text
accompanying notes 43-47.
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law but every reason to apply Ohio law. This analysis generally follows the
approach of interest analysis and specifically that of Currie.54 Although the
inquiry normally would have ended at this point, Justice Duncan, in dicta,
outlined a process for resolving true conflicts. He suggested a "substantial
state interest" test. 155
Justice Leach's concurrence was supported by two of the justices who
had also concurred with Justice Duncan and by one who had not. 156 It demon-
strates a more conservative attitude toward choice of law. While Justice
Leach agreed that the court should not apply lex loci automatically, he pro-
tested abandonment of this rule. Instead, he suggested that Fox merely carved
out an exception to the traditional approach. 157 Justice Leach characterized
the modem trend as a "most significant contact" test 158 and warned of the
uncertainty and confusion that application of modem theories would cause. '59
Fox was a positive development in Ohio law; Ohio courts finally had
attempted to deal with new conflicts methodologies. Fox was a failure, how-
ever, because the court did not address the issues adequately. Rather than
surveying options other than lex loci delicti and providing a choice based on
sound reasoning, the Fox opinions drastically altered the law without provid-
ing sufficient basis in the sources of the major new choice-of-law trends. 60
The case apparently was decided with only a vague awareness by most mem-
bers of the court of developments in the field.
The Duncan opinion invites misinterpretation. In one crucial sentence
the justice wrote: "[I]n such a case the automatic application of the rule of lex
loci delicti must be abandoned."' 161 Strong language such as "must be
abandoned" seems to indicate radical change. Upon closer inspection, how-
ever, one realizes that its meaning is emasculated by the modifiers "in such a
case" and "automatic." Thus, it is impossible to divine the author's position.
Indeed, the differing conclusions of subsequent cases demonstrate the prob-
lematic nature of the Fox decision. And although the Leach concurrence
accurately predicted much of the confusion that followed Fox, it made no
attempt to avoid this consequence.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 48-61. Despite the abundance of legal authority in this field,
Justice Duncan cited neither Currie nor any other source of modem choice-of-law theories.
155. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 199,267 N.E.2d 405,408, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971). Again, Justice Duncan
did not mention the source of this approach, nor did he elaborate on its meaning.
156. Id. at 202, 267 N.E.2d at 410 (Leach, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. This apparently is a cross between a "'grouping of contacts" approach, which originated in the case of
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), and the "most significant relationship" test of the Second
Restatement, see supra text accompanying notes 62-77.
159. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193,202,267 N.E.2d 405,410 (Leach, J., concurring), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
160. Schneider, Lex Loci Delicti: A Dying Choice of Law Approach in Ohio Tort Cases, 32 OHIO ST. L.J.
790, 813 (1971).
161. 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 195, 267 N.E.2d 405, 406, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971). It is in this portion of
the opinion that Duncan outlined the major shortcomings of lex loci delicti and drew the conclusion that Ohio
law should be changed. The language quoted is the principal statement of this holding.
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B. The Aftermath of Fox
Even though the Fox decision adopted modem conflicts methodologies,
it left a void in Ohio law. In Fox the Ohio Supreme Court seemed to indicate a
new direction for Ohio choice of law. It failed, however, to provide specific
instructions to guide future decisions. The court suggested that the true-false
conflict dichotomy was crucial,' 62 but did not say when a court should invoke
that distinction. Justice Duncan implied that a specific test existed to resolve
true conflicts, but he mentioned neither the details of the test nor the
mechanics of its application. 63 Furthermore, the majority opinion does not
clarify whether public policy should be discarded as an exception to lex loci or
whether the public policy doctrine exists alongside modem methodologies.
Although an excellent survey of Ohio conflicts law, published shortly
after the Fox decision, suggested that the Second Restatement should be
adopted, this advice either escaped the attention of Ohio courts or went
unheeded. "6 In general, although later decisions parallel Fox in their use of
interest analysis as a tool to resolve choice-of-law issues, the later opinions do
not employ any specific theory or analytical approach. Rather, subsequent
decisions demonstrate a crude balancing of some interests and provide lan-
guage that justifies the courts' use of lex loci delicti.'6 The decisions sub-
sequent to Fox show a decided lack of consistency, with the possible excep-
tion of some consensus on the broadest level of analysis.
1. Schiltz v. Meyer-Fox Modified
Schiltz v. Meyer'66 followed Fox by approximately one year. In Schiltz a
Kentucky resident sued another Kentucky resident in an Ohio court for in-
juries sustained in an accident that had occurred in Ohio. The Ohio Supreme
Court found that both the substantive and the procedural law of Ohio gov-
erned the cause of action.167 While the court agreed that it should not apply lex
loci automatically, the Leach concurrence was cited as the controlling author-
ity, rather than the majority opinion in Fox. Because Fox had rejected the use
of the law of the place of injury, the Schiltz court explained why it reached a
different conclusion. It first mentioned the importance of public policy in
Fox. 1's The Schiltz court also noted the absence of Illinois interests in that
case. 169 Essentially, the Schiltz opinion said that Fox had presented no com-
pelling reason for the application of Illinois law. In distinguishing that situa-
162. Id. at 198, 267 N.E.2d at 408.
163. Id.
164. Schneider, Lex Loci Delicti: A Dying Choice of LawApproach in Oito Tort Cases, 32 OHIO ST. L.J.
790 (1971).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 234-39.
166. 29 Ohio St. 2d 169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972).
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
169. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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tion from Schiltz, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that plaintiffs choice of an
Ohio court
increased our governmental interest beyond that of merely being the state in which
the accident occurred. We now have the additional interest of advancing, in our
courts, those policies which our General Assembly has seen fit to maintain in this
area of tort law. Until such time as the General Assembly amends or repeals our
guest statute, we are bound to apply it in cases before our courts wherein the
accident occurred in Ohio. l70
The decision firmly stated that when a nonresident chooses an Ohio court in
which to sue another nonresident for damages due to an automobile accident,
Ohio will apply its own law in the litigation. 171
Although the Schiltz court paid lip service to interest analysis, it retreated
to the traditional approach to conflicts law. Not only was the result identical
to that which would have been obtained had the court employed pure lex loci
delicti, but the interests of the other state concerned were not even men-
tioned. Furthermore, the only state concern that was considered, Ohio's in-
terest as the plaintiffs choice of forum, is not a legitimate governmental
interest under modem theories. 72 A preference for the law of the forum could
be justified under the Currie approach, but Currie uses lex fori only after
interest analysis has failed to resolve the conflict.' 73 Although the court cited
Leflar earlier in the opinion,' 74 thus implying that it had adopted his approach,
the result in Schiltz is inconsistent with Leflar's theories. Indeed, in explain-
ing the fourth choice-influencing consideration-advancement of the forum's
governmental interests-Leflar suggested that a Schiltz-style analysis would
misapply this consideration.'75
It is interesting to note that in the same year that Schiltz was decided the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the use of modern analysis in an intestate suc-
cession case. The Lucas County Court of Appeals had utilized governmental
interest, in an analysis styled after Leflar, to reach a nontraditional result.
This methodology was rejected on appeal. 176
2. Moats v. Metropolitan Bank
In Moats v. Metropolitan Bank, 177 which followed Schiltz, the Ohio
Supreme Court again rejected the application of lex loci. The conflict arose
when two Ohio residents were killed in an airplane crash in Pennsylvania.
One estate sued the other, and the personal representatives of both decedents
170. 29 Ohio St. 2d 169, 172, 280 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1972).
171. Id. at 172, 280 N.E.2d at 927.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47 & 162-65.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 48-61.
174. 29 Ohio St. 2d 169, 171, 280 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1972).
175. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 291 (1966).
176. Howard v. Reynolds, 30 Ohio St. 2d 214, 283 N.E.2d 629 (1972).
177. 40 Ohio St. 2d 47, 319 N.E.2d 603 (1974).
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resided in Ohio.' 78 Ohio's airplane guest statute precluded plaintiff's re-
covery; Pennsylvania law permitted it. 179 The Moats court cited Fox and
Schiltz in support of its decision not to apply lex loci delicti automatically. In
Moats, as in Schiltz, the court distinguished previous inconsistent cases on
public policy grounds. 80 Justice Herbert, writing for a unanimous court,
found that Pennsylvania had little interest in the litigation because all the
contacts were with Ohio. The only event that had occurred outside Ohio was
the crash itself. Justice Herbert noted that the court not only considered the
interests of each state, but also recognized a duty to respect Ohio's policy as
expressed in its guest statute.' 8' The court held that Pennsylvania's interest
could not outweigh Ohio's concerns.'8 2
Moats is important in two respects. First, the Moats court employed
interest analysis, albeit by a somewhat circuitous route. Although the inter-
ests clearly weighed in favor of Ohio, Ohio's paramount concern should have
been the regulation of guest-host relationships between Ohio residents. The
court could have recognized that Ohio had the following legitimate concerns:
(1) Protecting an Ohio host from liability to ungrateful guests, (2) protecting
the insurers of Ohio citizens from collusive suits, or (3) reducing claims by
guests against insurers of Ohio hosts. 8 3 These interests were not even men-
tioned. In addition, an Ohio corporation owned the plane and kept it hangared
in the state. These circumstances also may have created legitimate interests.
Administration of the estate in Ohio, which was mentioned, did not, however,
constitute a legitimate concern. ' 4 Second, the Moats court emphasized
public policy. Although policy can be an element in modern analysis, correct
application of interest analysis not only demonstrates that the policy exists in
a particular state, but also explains why the contacts underlying the cause of
action bring that policy into play. Furthermore, one must show that the other
states concerned have neither a stronger policy nor a nexus to the occur-
rence. 8 5 This application of interest analysis was not performed correctly in
Moats. Instead, the court, as in previous cases, apparently used public policy
in the traditional sense-as an exception to the rule of lex loci delicti.
3. THE EFFECT OF SCHILTZ COMBINED WITH MOATS
Interpreted together, Schiltz and Moats demonstrate that Ohio courts are
receptive to the more flexible, modern approaches to choice of law. These
cases, however, also show Ohio's continued adherence to the traditional
178. Id. at 47, 319 N.E.2d at 603.
179. Id. at 47-48, 319 N.E.2d at 603.
180. Id. at 49, 319 N.E.2d at 604.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Sedler, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1628, 1633-34 (1981).
184. Compare supra notes 151 and 153 and accompanying text.
185. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6.1-.8, at 266-77 (2d ed. 1980).
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conflicts theories. While both courts agreed that lex loci should not be used
routinely, they did not follow Justice Duncan's language in Fox, which called
for a radical departure from the traditional doctrine. Indeed, the Schiltz court
stubbornly used the traditional rule in a situation in which its application made
no sense according to modern theories. 186 Although Schiltz contains strong
language requiring the application of lex loci in similar fact patterns, Ohio's
guest statute has since been found unconstitutional.'s7 Thus, future courts will
easily distinguish this case, and Schiltz will not discourage the use of more
modern analysis.
C. The Trend of the Early Seventies
An analysis of Fox, Schiltz, and Moats indicates that Ohio law still lacks
concrete guidelines for resolution of conflicts issues. A few general trends,
however, have emerged. Most important, Ohio law clearly allows departure
from the strict application of lex loci, and Ohio courts value consideration of
state interests. Yet, because of unfamiliarity with current theories, Ohio
courts have misapplied modern approaches in previous decisions, and re-
liance on the reasoning of these cases may be unwarranted. Any argument or
decision based on the modern approaches must begin with a thorough analysis
of their methodology. Although Ohio courts are receptive to interest analysis,
lex loci delicti remains a contender in any choice-of-law battle. '8 It is unclear
which modem theory Ohio courts endorse, and Ohio attorneys who are un-
comfortable using modern methodologies may not rely on these techniques
unless a clear injustice is apparent. Thus, Ohio law will have a strong ten-
dency to retain its emphasis on lex loci, except in unusual situations.
Finally, a strong thread of public policy considerations runs through all
these cases. In Fox public policy was listed as an alternative ground for the
decision; 8 9 in Schiltz and Moats the court held that Ohio's guest statute
reflected a strong policy of the Ohio General Assembly'90 and, therefore, was
significant to the choice of law. Although it is unclear whether the courts in
these cases used public policy in the traditional sense, as an exception to lex
loci delicti, or misapplied it, as an Ohio interest in the context of interest
analysis, public policy is an important consideration in Ohio conflicts law.
D. Federal Court Cases Using Ohio Conflicts Law
Many cases that include choice-of-law issues are tried in the federal
courts under diversity jurisdiction. Between 1974 and 1977 federal courts
186. Since both the plaintiff and the defendant were nonresidents, Ohio had no interest in applying its guest
statute. Use of Ohio law would neither protect an Ohio host from liability nor reduce Ohio insurance premiums.
187. Ohio's guest statute was found unconstitutional in Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723
(1975).
188. Ohio Jurisprudence continues to cite lex loci delicti as the general rule in Ohio. 16 OHIO JUR. 3D
Conflict of Laws § 42 (1979).
189. See supra text accompanying note 149.
190. See supra text accompanyinj notes 170 & 179-81.
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decided six cases concerning Ohio conflicts rules. ' 9' Although these decisions
did not expressly attempt to influence Ohio law, they are considered here for
several reasons. First, the federal court cases provide an illuminating inter-
pretation of Ohio decisions. Second, the opinions constitute a large propor-
tion of the total volume of multistate litigation. Third, the lack of clear guide-
lines in current conflicts law, coupled with the possibility of differing inter-
pretations of Ohio law in state and federal courts, increases the importance of
the plaintiff's choice of forum.
1. Case-by-Case Analysis
In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation'92 was the first conflicts case
decided in federal district court after Fox. This suit against the United States
Government followed the collapse of a bridge connecting Ohio with West
Virginia. A large number of persons were either killed or injured.' 93 The court
found that Ohio had adopted a form of interest analysis and noted that both
states were legitimately concerned with the application of tort liability stan-
dards to their own citizens. Nevertheless, the court held that Ohio would have
applied its law to the cases in which death occurred on the Ohio portion of the
river and would have applied West Virginia law to the others.194 Thus, al-
though it found interests based on residence, the court's decision rested on
the place of death-in essence, the traditional lex loci delicti rule.
Kliner v. Weirton Steel,' 95 decided in the same year as Silver Bridge, was
a wrongful death suit resulting from an explosion at a West Virginia construc-
tion site. Plaintiff was a resident of Ohio, which allowed unlimited recovery.
West Virginia, on the other hand, did not permit full recovery. The court
applied West Virginia law. 96 The Kliner court noted that it was required to
follow the conflicts rules of the state in which it was sitting. 97 According to
the district judge, Ohio had adopted a flexible approach to choice of law and
its courts had tempered lex loci with an "evaluation of competing govern-
mental interests."'' 98 The court studied the concerns of each state. Ohio
possessed an interest in compensating resident tort victims; West Virginia
was concerned with the standard of care governing contractors in that state.
Because the court found that the interests were equal, it adhered to the
traditional lex loci delicti. '99 Although the opinion mentions public policy, it
191. Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976); MeCluskey v. Rob San Serv., 443 F. Supp.
65 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Michell v. General Motors Corp., 439 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel,
390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); Kliner v. Weirton Steel, 381 F. Supp. 275 (N.D. Ohio 1974); In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litig., 381 F.
Supp. 931 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
192. 381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
193. Id. at 934.
194. Id. at 946.
195. 381 F. Supp. 275 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
196. Id. at 277.
197. Id. at 276.
198. Id. The court also mentioned a "clear and substantial governmental interest" test. Id. at 277.
199. Id. at 277.
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seems to ignore the determinative role that public policy had played in pre-
vious cases. Yet the language in the previous cases indicates that Ohio's
strong policy of full compensation would outweigh even West Virginia's con-
cern with the standard of care in Kliner.
200
Saalfrank v. O'Daniel201 followed Kliner in 1975. In Saalfrank the plain-
tiff, an Indiana resident, was injured by the defendant, an Ohio resident, in an
accident that occurred in Ohio. The plaintiff also alleged malpractice against
an Indiana hospital that had treated the plaintiff after the accident.202 At issue
was the right of the Ohio defendant to either indemnification or contribution
from the hospital.0 3 Ohio law would have granted the defendant this right;
Indiana law was unclear. The court held that Ohio law applied.2°4 According
to the Saalfrank court, Ohio's approach was a balancing of interests.0 5
Apparently, the court was referring to a rough weighing of state concerns.
Proceeding to study the relevant interests, the district judge found that
Indiana's concerns were too ambiguous to ascertain. In contrast, Ohio's
interests were clear: they included shielding Ohio defendants from higher
damage verdicts resulting from the negligence of hospitals and supplying Ohio
insurance carriers with a standard for measuring their risks for accidents
occurring in Ohio.2°
The Saalfrank court was under the impression that Ohio had abandoned
lex loci delicti, even though no previous Ohio cases had reached that conclu-
sion. 20 7 Furthermore, while interest analysis obviously played a role in Ohio
law at this time, Ohio did not clearly apply any specific kind of modem
analysis. 20
Jones v. Wittenberg University,2°9 decided in 1976 by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, arose from the shooting death of a student by a university
security guard.2 t0 Decedent's estate was being administered in Pennsylvania;
Pennsylvania and Ohio allowed different amounts of damages. The Jones
court applied Ohio substantive law. The court interpreted Fox to mean that
Ohio no longer used lex loci, but instead had instituted interest analysis.
Because Ohio was both the place of the wrong and the state of the decedent's
residence, the court concluded that Ohio possessed the paramount interest in
the calculation of damages.21' That the plaintiff based the action on the Ohio
200. See supra text accompanying note 153.
201. 390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
202. Id. at 47-48.
203. Id. at 45-46.
204. Id. at 57.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. The court cited Fox and Schiltz as authority. Id.
208. The only approaches that Ohio courts had mentioned at this time were the substantial governmental
interest test (Justice Duncan) and the most significant contacts approach (Justice Leach), both in Fox. Seesupra
text accompanying notes 155 & 158.
209. 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976).
210. Id. at 1206.
211. Id. at 1213.
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wrongful death statute was a significant factor in the court's decision. The
court acknowledged Pennsylvania's interest in the administration of the
estate, but found that this interest was outweighed by the strong Ohio con-
cerns.
212
In 1977 the federal courts decided several Ohio conflicts cases, including
Michell v. General Motors Corp.21 3 This products liability case was based on
the allegedly negligent design and manufacture of a child's safety seat. The
accident occurred in Canada, plaintiff's domicile. Defendant corporation was
located in Michigan, where the seat had been manufactured.2 4 The court
dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens,2 5 in part be-
cause of its determination that under Ohio choice-of-law rules Ontario law
would apply. According to the district court, Ohio used "the substantive law
of the place of the injury absent compelling governmental interest to the
contrary., 216 The court could not discover any Michigan or Ohio interests
that demanded the application of a law other than that of Ontario.
217
McCluskey v. Rob San Services,2 8 also decided in 1977, was a suit for
wrongful death. Decedent and his personal representative were from New
York. The accident occurred in Ohio, and the choice-of-law issue concerned a
release of liability granted by decedent's estranged wife, a Georgia resident,
on behalf of herself and the couple's five children.2 9 Judge Duncan, who had
written the Fox opinion while on the Supreme Court of Ohio, found another
opportunity to address Ohio conflicts law in his McCluskey opinion. The
opinion reflects the court's confusion over whether it should characterize the
release as a contract or as an affirmative defense in tort.220 The court decided
that the release was a tort issue, at least between the wife and the defendants,
and held that Ohio law applied. 22'
The opinion lists alternative grounds for the resolution of each issue.
Judge Duncan argued that lex loci mandated application of Ohio law to the
issue of the release as an affirmative defense against the claims of the wife.
222
Regarding the children, he characterized the issue of the release first as one of
contract, then, alternatively, as one of tort. During his discussion of the tort
aspects of the release, Judge Duncan cited his own opinion in Fox and held
212. Id.
213. 439 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
214. Id. at 27.
215. Id. at 26-27. Forum non coneniens is defined broadly as -[t]he doctrine or principle that where, in a
broad sense, the ends of justice strongly indicate that the controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere,
jurisdiction should be declined and the parties relegated to relief to be sought in another forum."
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 493 (3d ed. 1969).
216. 439 F. Supp. 24, 27 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
217. Id.
218. 443 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
219. Id. at 68.
220. Id. The problem of characterization is not new to choice of law. It exists under both the traditional and
the modem rules because both require an initial determination of which set of rules apply. For a good discussion
of this problem, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 87-88 (3d ed. 1977).
221. 443 F. Supp. 65, 68-69 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
222. Id. at 68.
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that Ohio had adopted the "substantial state governmental interest" test '
for choice of law. This assertion directly contradicts his statement earlier in
the opinion that lex loci delicti was the Ohio rule. Thus, McCluskey gave two
mutually exclusive renditions of Ohio law. Although the court correctly ap-
plied interest analysis and held that Georgia had the more substantial interests
in determining whether a mother domiciled in Georgia can bind her minor
children,224 the significance of the application of interest analysis in
McCluskey is questionable because of the confusing and inconsistent nature
of the opinion as a whole.
2. General Trends of Choice of Law in the Federal Courts
In all six of the above cases the federal courts acknowledged the use of
modem theories in Ohio. Nevertheless, the courts were influenced greatly by
the traditional lex loci doctrine. The results of Silver Bridge, Kliner, Jones,
and Michell were almost identical to those that would have been obtained
under pure lex loci delicti.225 In Saalfrank the law of the place of the wrong
controlled the initial, or primary, tort, while the court used interest analysis to
achieve a different result on the secondary negligence issue.2 6 Similarly, the
court in McCluskey decided most of the issues using traditional methodol-
ogies, but gave an alternative ground for its decision that used a variation of
interest analysis.227 In addition, every case gave a different interpretation of
the specific modem approach allegedly adopted in Ohio. 2
The variety of approaches used by federal courts in interpreting Ohio law
leaves counsel considerable flexibility to argue for a particular method of
determining and weighing the various interests in Ohio cases. It would be
erroneous, however, to conclude that there are no guidelines at all; although
223. Id. at 71.
224. Id.
225. The following chart illustrates the results of these cases:
case place of wrong applicable law
Silver Bridge Ohio and Ohio and
West Virginia West Virginia
Kliner West Virginia West Virginia
Jones Ohio Ohio
Michell Ontario Ontario
226. See supra text accompanying notes 204-06.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
228. Compare the following descriptions of Ohio law:
case description of Ohio law
Silver Bridge form of interest analysis
Kliner evaluation of competing interest
Saallrank balancing of interests
Jones interest analysis
Michell lex loci absent compelling governmental
interest to the contrary
McCluskey lex loci delicti
substantial state governmental interest
see text accompanying
supra note 194.
supra note 199.
supra notes 211-12.
supra note 216.
see text accompanying
supra notes 193-94.
supra notes 198-99.
supra note 205.
supra note 211.
supra note 216.
supra note 222.
supra note 223.
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no two interpretations of Ohio law are identical, some areas of general similar-
ity are apparent. All descriptions of Ohio law contain a broad, flexible study
of the interests of the states concerned. And although no definite formula
emerges for identifying and ranking state concerns, all the opinions recognize
that the Ohio approach includes some balancing of interests, albeit crude and
sometimes biased. Furthermore, one observes a strong trend toward applying
the law of the place of injury, regardless of whether this result is couched in
terms of traditional or modem theories.
E. Ohio Choice of Law in the Eighties
After the Moats opinion a lull occurred in Ohio choice-of-law decisions.
This silence was broken in late 1980 with Bonkowsky v. Bonkoivsky.229 An
Ohio resident sued her husband, also domiciled in Ohio, for injuries resulting
from an automobile accident in Vermont. Although Vermont law would have
allowed recovery and the insurance policy did not bar the claim, Ohio adhered
to the doctrine of interspousal immunity.2'3 The trial court had refused to
apply the law of Vermont, the place of injury.23' The plaintiff alleged that the
trial court had erred in failing to follow lex loci delicti and that the claim
should not have been barred 3 2 On appeal the Cuyahoga County Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court.2
33
The appellate court began its reasoning by noting Ohio's consistent ad-
herence to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 34 It then held that lex loci
had been abandoned in Ohio and that Ohio now used a more modem ap-
proach. 235 The court reasoned that Ohio "has rejected the 'rote application of
lex loci delicti' where considerations of public policy should accompany the
judicial resolution of conflicts between the laws of other states." 236 The court
determined that Ohio had a clear, strong policy against negligence actions
between spouses. It characterized the place of the accident as fortuitous,
suggesting that the location was of only secondary importance in the decision.
Because Ohio possessed a "paramount, continuing interest"' 237 in the
couple's relationship, the court found that Ohio's policy took precedence
over the interest of Vermont.238 Therefore, the plaintiff could not recover
damages2 39
229. 19 Ohio Op. 3d 113 (Ct. App. 1980), aff d, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152,431 N.E.2d 998, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2963 (1982).
230. The leading Ohio cases upholding interspousal immunity are Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269,
383 N.E.2d 888 (1978), and Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
231. 19 Ohio Op. 3d 113, 113 (Ct. App. 1980).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 114.
234. Id. at 113.
235. Id. at 114.
236. Id.
237. Id. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
238. 19 Ohio Op. 3d 113, 114 (Ct. App. 1980).
239. Id. This is the type of situation in which Leflarwould call fora decision based on the better rule oflaw.
See supra text accompanying notes 85-87. For example, Minnesota, a state that views Leflar's theory favor-
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Unlike previous decisions, the Bonkowsky opinion demonstrates an
awareness of modem theories in choice of law and thus makes an important
contribution to Ohio conflicts law. Although the court's opinion does not
outline a formula for ascertaining and weighing interests in Ohio cases, it does
cite authority for modem conflicts theory: the court specifically mentioned
the Second Restatement as the proper method of modem analysis. The
opinion seems to rely heavily on section 6, which lists very general considera-
tions for all choice-of-law decisions.24 Section 146, the rule that creates a
presumption of lex loci, is not mentioned. This endorsement of the Second
Restatement approach 24' clarifies the direction in which Ohio has embarked
and provides a reference point for future litigation.
The Bonkowsky case is significant because it also represents a continua-
tion of the emphasis on public policy seen in earlier cases.242 When future
litigation involves a strong Ohio public policy such as interspousal immunity,
this concern likely will weigh heavily in a choice-of-law decision. Although
Ohio courts often have failed to articulate public policy in terms of govern-
mental interests, policy frequently is analyzed in the same manner as interest
analysis. The courts perceive public policy as a strong Ohio interest, one
which either mandates that the courts invoke the traditional exception to lex
loci or tips the balance in favor of Ohio law under modem approaches. In
cases demonstrating strong inclinations toward the application of lex loci
delicti, public policy will appear in its traditional role as an exception to that
rule. In other instances, when the traditional rule produces an unjust result,
policy more likely will constitute a strong Ohio interest. One should not
assume, however, that lex loci will be abandoned in the near future in favor of
interest analysis; it is an old rule and may suffer from lack of flexibility, but
nevertheless retains considerable vitality.
A study of Ohio conflicts cases from the last decade, then, has revealed
recurring themes. A gradual decrease in exclusive reliance on the traditional
tort rule has been accompanied by a gradual increase in the importance of new
choice-of-law theories. The important, if somewhat ambiguous, role played
by public policy has become apparent.
A survey of the recent developments in Ohio conflicts law would be
incomplete, however, without any mention of what is lacking. Certain aspects
of the choice-of-law revolution have not affected Ohio. First, the courts have
not mentioned the Currie methodology specifically, even though his true-false
ably, refused to apply Ontario's guest statute in a case concerning two Ontario residents who had been in an
accident in Minnesota. The court believed that its own law permitting recovery was wiser. Milkovich v. Saari,
295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
241. Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 19 Ohio Op. 3d 113, 114 (Ct. App. 1980), affd, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 431
N.E.2d 998, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2963 (1982). See also Young v. That Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp.
1337, 1339 (N.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
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conflicts dichotomy has been employed. 243 Some courts have found that the
forum possesses interests by virtue of being the place where the plaintiffs
chose to sue; 244 their analyses were vague, however, and may not have been
an articulation of Currie's preference for lexfori. The Bonkowsky court men-
tioned Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, but rejected application of
the better rule of law even though counsel specifically argued that inter-
spousal immunity was outdated.245 Courts have followed both Leflar's theory
and the Second Restatement because each incorporates the very flexible,
general principles of modem choice-of-law theory and presents relevant con-
siderations for a conflicts decision. 246 Ohio does not appear to have embraced
the third and most rigid tier of the Second Restatement rules, however, be-
cause in those cases in which traditional rules were considered important,
courts have had the opportunity to resort to the first Restatement. In addi-
tion, unlike some other states, Ohio has failed to exhibit any significant bias
toward residents. 247 Similarly, proplaintiff and prorecovery tendencies are
absent. 248
V. CONCLUSION
Conflict of laws is not an easy field. Furthermore, since the percentage of
all cases that concern conflicts issues is small, an attorney has little oppor-
tunity to become familiar with choice-of-law methodology and little incentive
to stay abreast of modem developments. The lack of consensus in choice of
law generally, and in Ohio specifically, compounds these problems. Con-
sequently, courts often have decided multistate causes of action without
adequately considering the available theories and the various methods for
choosing between competing law. The inconsistency, ambiguity, and vague-
ness of Ohio opinions in the last fifteen years illustrate this phenomenon.
While no single correct method exists for choosing the law to govern multi-
state litigation, legal commentary on the subject is sufficient to enable Ohio
courts to make logical choices among the various possibilities.
Over ten years ago one scholar suggested that the Ohio courts explicitly
adopt the approach of the Second Restatement.249 This suggestion is even
243. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. This approach was employed in Fox v. Morrison Motor
Freight, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
244. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 166-71.
245. The court insisted on applying Ohio's outdated interspousal immunity. See supra text accompanying
note 234.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 174 & 62-79.
247. For a thorough discussion of the ramifications of the parties' domiciles on a choice-of-law discussion,
as well as illustrative cases, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.1-. 16 (2d
ed. 1980).
248. Id. § 6.4. Again, Weintraub provides excellent commentary on the trend toward recovery in tort cases.
249. Schneider, Lex Loci Delicti: A Dying Choice of Law Approach in Ohio Tort Cases, 32 OHIO ST. L.J.
790 (1971).
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more appropriate today. The Second Restatement's analysis would allow
courts the flexibility to decide individual cases justly, but would provide
judges with the opportunity to use more traditional rules when appropriate.
This approach would transform Ohio's emphasis on public policy into a
governmental interest. Public policy would not lose its importance in Ohio
law, but would continue to play a significant role in future decisions. Adop-
tion of the Second Restatement will not resolve all future conflicts issues
automatically; it will go far, however, toward transforming the labyrinth of
Ohio law into a comprehensible set of legal principles.
Sonja M. Hailer
